

**UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT ROYALTY JUDGES**  
**The Library of Congress**

*In re*

**DETERMINATION OF ROYALTY RATES AND TERMS FOR EPHEMERAL RECORDING AND DIGITAL PERFORMANCE OF SOUND RECORDINGS (WEB IV)**

**Docket No. 14-CRB-0001-WR  
(2016-2020)**

*In re*

**DETERMINATION OF ROYALTY RATES AND TERMS FOR NEW SUBSCRIPTION SERVICES FOR DIGITAL PERFORMANCE RIGHT IN SOUND RECORDINGS AND EPHEMERAL RECORDINGS (New Subscription III)**

**Docket No. 14-CRB-0002-NSR  
(2016-2020)**

**ORDER DISMISSING PETITION TO PARTICIPATE  
(MUSIC REPORTS)**

**I. Introduction**

On April 30, 2014, the Copyright Royalty Judges (Judges) issued an Order to Show Cause directing Music Reports, Inc. (Music Reports) to show cause, if any there be, why its Petitions to Participate in the captioned proceedings should not be dismissed. Music Reports filed a timely response on May 14, 2014.

**II. The Applicable Statute and Legislative History**

Under the Copyright Act (Act), 17 U.S.C. § 803(b)(2)(C), only parties that have a "significant interest in a proceeding" may participate.<sup>1</sup> The Judges may make a determination *sua sponte*, or on the motion of another participant, that a party seeking to participate lacks a significant interest. Neither the Act nor the Judges' rules defines, however, what constitutes a "significant interest." To interpret this legislative language the Judges consider both the legislative history of section 803(b)(2) of the Act and prior decisions under the Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) system<sup>2</sup> for guidance.

<sup>1</sup> Other requirements are that the party file a Petition to Participate that is facially valid and pay the appropriate filing fee. 17 U.S.C. § 803(b)(2)(A), (B) and (D).

<sup>2</sup> Section 803(a)(1) of the Act directs the Judges to act in accordance with, *inter alia*, prior determinations and interpretations of the Copyright Royalty Tribunal, the Librarian of Congress, the Register of Copyrights and the CARPs.

The House Report<sup>3</sup> accompanying the Copyright Royalty Distribution Reform Act of 2004<sup>4</sup> states, with regard to the “significant interest” prerequisite:

[T]he [House Judiciary] Committee intends the “significant interest” requirement to restrict participation to those who have a stake in the outcome of the proceeding. In other words, to have a significant interest in a royalty rate, the participant must be a party directly affected by the royalty fee (*e.g.*, as a copyright owner, a copyright user, or an entity or organization involved in the collection and distribution of royalties). As a copyright owner, one has a significant interest in a royalty rate because the rate determines how much the owner will receive in compulsory license fees from the use of his or her works. As a copyright user, one has a significant interest in a royalty rate because the rate determines how much that party must pay for the use of copyrighted works. Included in these categories are organizations and societies that represent the rights and interests of copyright owners and users.

H.R. Rep. No. 108-408, at 27 (2004) (House Report).

More broadly, the House Report describes the purpose of the significant interest requirement as ensuring that “only parties with legally protectable and tangible interests may take part” in proceedings. *Id.* “[T]he Committee intends the ‘significant interest’ requirement to restrict participation to those who have a stake in the outcome of the proceeding. In other words, to have a significant interest in a royalty rate, the participant must be a party directly affected by the royalty fee ....” *Id.*<sup>5</sup>

Nothing in the legislative history indicates that the specific examples in the House Report of entities with “significant interests” sufficient to permit their participation in royalty rate proceedings were intended to comprise the entire universe of such entities. Nor does the legislative history suggest that all entities that perform any of the mentioned functions automatically have a “significant interest.” Thus, as the Judges recently noted, “there is no categorical bright-line test to determine whether a party has a significant interest in a given proceeding.” *NMPA Order*, at 3; *see also Determination of Reasonable Rates and Terms for the Digital Performance of Sound Recordings by Preexisting Subscription Services*, Docket No. 2001-1 CARP DSTR, 68 Fed. Reg. 39837, 39839 (Jul. 3, 2003) (PSS II) (Decision by Copyright Office holding “[t]he inquiry is a factual one and determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis.”).

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<sup>3</sup> The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the most authoritative extrinsic source for legislative intent lies in the committee reports on a bill. *See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30, 44 n.7 (1986).

<sup>4</sup> Pub.L.No. 108-419, 118 Stat. 2341 (Nov. 30, 2004).

<sup>5</sup> This “significant interest” test is analogous to the determination of “standing” in federal courts. *See Determination of Royalty Rates and Terms for Ephemeral Recording and Digital Performance of Sound Recordings (Web IV)*, Docket No. 14-CRB-0001-WR (2016-2020), Order Granting SoundExchange Motion to Deny the Petition to Participate of National Music Publishers’ Association, at 3 n.6 (April 30, 2014) (“*NMPA Order*”). Where, as here, there are already multiple participants with clearly significant interests, such as the licensees themselves and their trade association, the question of whether to permit participation by a non-licensee who will advocate on the licensees’ behalf is perhaps more analogous to a question of intervention rather than standing. Considered in that context, a denial of a putative party’s right to participate would not foreclose the substantive result sought by that putative party.

### III. Music Reports Lacks the Required “Significant Interest”

Music Reports’s description of its business activity does not demonstrate a significant interest in this proceeding.<sup>6</sup> The sole example that Music Reports describes is its services on behalf of Sirius XM, which it *does not* provide in connection with the statutory licenses at issue in this proceeding.<sup>7</sup> As Music Reports admits, its services on behalf of Sirius XM consist of:

- negotiating *voluntary* licenses;
- collecting and paying royalty fee under *voluntary* licenses;
- identifying the *voluntarily*-licensed sound recordings for Sirius XM;
- preparing and delivering to SoundExchange information regarding pre-1972 recordings, *i.e.*, recordings that are *not covered by the statutory license*;
- preparing and delivering to record labels accountings under *voluntary* licenses; and
- preparing and delivering to SoundExchange monthly playlists and channel guides for sound recordings used under the statutory licenses.

*Music Reports Response* at 3.

None of these services relates to the statutory licenses at issue in this proceeding. Rather, they relate only to either *voluntary* licenses or sound recordings that *are not subject to federal copyright*.<sup>8</sup> Indeed, Music Reports admits as much by acknowledging “Sirius XM ... *and not Music Reports* ... calculates and pays the [s]tatutory [l]icense royalties.” *Music Reports Response* at 3-4 (emphasis added). Despite this admission, Music Reports concludes, without adequate support, that the calculation and payment of royalties under the statutory licenses and under the voluntary licenses are “inherently interconnected.” *Id.* at 4.<sup>9</sup>

The Judges reject the assertion by Music Reports that its work with regard to the *voluntary* licenses of its clients demonstrates that it has any connection to the present proceeding, let alone a “significant interest” in this proceeding. Indeed, it would be illogical to maintain that Music Reports’s provision of services with regard to matters *not* covered by the statutory license somehow justifies its participation in a proceeding that concerns only the statutory licenses.

<sup>6</sup> This is not to say that no business that only “provides license administration and royalty payment services in connection with the statutory licenses available pursuant to 17 U.S.C. Sections 112 and 114,” *Music Reports Response* at 1 (quoting its *Petition to Participate* at 1), can have a significant interest in proceedings pursuant to those sections of the Act. For example, a license administration and royalty payment service business could theoretically constitute “an entity or organization involved in the collection and distribution of royalties” as identified in the House Report, and might thereby demonstrate a “significant interest.”

<sup>7</sup> By selecting its relationship with Sirius XM as its exemplar of a “significant interest” in this proceeding, Music Reports has implied that its relationships with its other customers do not have any greater connection to the present proceeding.

<sup>8</sup> Pre-1972 recordings are not subject to federal copyright, and are therefore not covered by the statutory licenses in the Copyright Act. Litigation is pending in several jurisdictions regarding the nature and scope of protection that pre-1972 sound recordings may enjoy under state law. *See, e.g., Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc.*, No. BC517032 (Super. Ct. Calif. filed Aug. 1, 2013) (subsequently removed to federal district court)... However, that issue is not relevant to the issues presented here.

<sup>9</sup> Music Reports does not attempt in its *Response* to explain how its work undertaken with regard to pre-1972 recordings is germane to the present proceeding.

With regard to the particular interest of Music Reports (as distinct from its clients' interests), the Judges understand Music Reports to argue that its revenues and profits will be reduced, *ceteris paribus*, if its clients are required to pay higher royalties, because its clients would have less revenue with which to pay for the services offered by Music Reports. In response to that argument, the Judges can do no better than quote from their recent *NMPA Order*:

While it is true that every dollar that a webcaster spends on sound recording royalties is a dollar that it cannot spend on musical works royalties, it is equally true that the same dollar cannot be spent on rent, utilities, stationery, and myriad other business expenses. NMPA's payment availability theory would permit any of a webcaster's vendors to participate in a rate proceeding.

*NMPA Order* at 3. As in the *NMPA Order* the Judges conclude here that this "payment availability theory" fails to demonstrate a direct or tangible interest sufficient to rise to the level of a "significant interest" under section 803(b)(2) of the Act.

Music Reports also argues that it may be required to perform new or different tasks depending upon the rates and terms ultimately adopted in this proceeding, causing it to incur some additional expense, again reducing profits. *See Music Reports Response* at 3 ("Music Reports provides administrative services to multiple licensees under the Statutory License."). The Judges cannot be influenced in proceedings under sections 112 and 114 however, by how the establishment of otherwise appropriate marketplace rates and terms might affect complementary service providers in the provision of their business services.<sup>10</sup>

The purpose of the statutory license for sound recordings is to establish "rates and terms that would have been negotiated in the marketplace between a willing buyer and a willing seller." 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B); *see also* 17 U.S.C. § 112(e)(4) (same test for ephemeral license). The statutory hypothetical market rates substitute for actual market rates for particular economic reasons: to overcome the intractable transaction costs that would lead to market failure if licensors and licensees were required to negotiate the royalty for each performance of a sound recording; and to ameliorate uncompetitive pricing that could arise if a private collective possessed the market power to establish royalty rates on behalf of all licensors. *See, e.g.,*

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<sup>10</sup> If Music Reports believes that any additional expenses it may incur or tasks it must undertake would be detrimental to its licensee-clients, it has other means to bring such information to the attention of the Judges. First, a representative of a service provider such as Music Reports could appear as a witness on behalf of a licensee or trade association. Second, a service provider such as Music Reports can provide financial support to its licensee-clients, or to a trade association, so that the customer or association has additional resources to provide the Judges with evidence, testimony, and legal argument that the service provider and its licensee-clients believe to be important. This form of non-participant involvement can be even more valuable, to the extent joint efforts create efficiencies and economies of scale, as compared to adding only another set of attorneys and economists, whose participation may be merely cumulative. In these ways, the legitimate and relevant concerns that Music Reports seeks to address would be brought to the attention of the Judges, without the attendant cost associated with the inclusion of an additional participant that may lack an independent significant interest. *See Ernest Gellhorn, Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings*, 81 Yale L. J. 359, 380-81 (1972) (When a putative party's interests are already represented by other parties, the putative party "should be encouraged to assist the existing parties" rather than be permitted to participate, which would be "wasteful, duplicative and unnecessarily burdensome.")

Randall Picker, *Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution*, 47 Antitrust Bull. 423, 464 (2002) (“statutory licenses ha[ve] the virtue of mitigating the exercise of monopoly power and minimizing the transaction costs of negotiations.”). By contrast, nothing in the statute, or in the economic rationale for the statutory license, suggests that the financial interests of the providers of complementary services should affect the rates and terms established in these proceedings.

Finally, the Judges note that Music Reports does not state whether any or all of its clients are otherwise represented in this proceeding, either directly or indirectly by the Digital Media Association (DiMa), “a trade organization representing the public policy and business interests of [its] member companies, including ... several that will utilize the license ... for which rates and terms will be set in this proceeding.” *DiMa Petition to Participate* (Feb. 3, 2014). To the extent the interests of Music Reports’s clients are already represented in this proceeding, its participation would be redundant. *See* Gellhorn, *supra*.<sup>11</sup>

#### IV. The Limited Scope of this Order

The Judges are not establishing a bright-line rule in this decision. Thus, the Judges are not ruling in this Order whether any or all other tangible interests of a putative participant would satisfy the *legal* “significant interest” test. In that regard, it is worth noting again that the *House Report* expressly identified entities “involved in the collection and distribution of royalties” as examples of entities possessing a legally “significant interest” to allow them to participate. Clearly, the functions of collecting and distributing funds—and the payments received to perform such services—are no more “directly related” economically to the royalties and terms established in this proceeding than are the functions and payments relating to the “myriad of other business expenses” incurred by webcasters.<sup>12</sup> Thus, some tangible economic interests might serve to support a petition to participate, and the Judges do not foreclose that possibility by this decision.

The limited scope of this Order is consistent with analogous principles of standing applied by the D.C. Circuit. *Cf. United Church of Christ v. FCC*, 359 F.2d 994, 1000 n. 8 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (applying same test for determining standing before agency and before court). As the

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<sup>11</sup> Redundancy is a factor for the Judges to consider, but it is by no means dispositive. For example, a licensee that directly pays substantial royalties under the section 112 and 114 licenses has an obviously significant interest sufficient to appear on its own behalf, even if a trade association to which it belongs is also a participant. That is, an individual licensee may also have peculiar interests that are not shared by other licensees and thus not sufficiently addressed by the trade association.

<sup>12</sup> Interestingly, although the House Report states why licensors and licensees have significant interests, it does not explain why an entity that provides the service of collecting and distributing royalties would also have a significant interest. House Report at 29. One reason why such a service provider would have a significant interest is that the licensee’s decision to “contract out” for license-specific services does not necessarily mean that the service provider has an “insignificant” interest in the proceeding. Indeed, the decision whether to “contract out” or to maintain a service “in house” should not be relevant to the issues of participation, standing and significant interest, because that decision is purely economic in nature. *See generally* Oliver E. Williamson, *The Transaction Cost Economics Project at xi* (2013) (noting abundant economic literature regarding the issue of “[w]hen is it more efficient to mediate the interface between successive stages of production by contract (market) rather than by hierarchy (unified ownership and operation)”); Ronald H. Coase, *The Nature of the Firm*, 4 *Economica* 386 (1937) (identifying economic reasons why a firm chooses between market (contract) supply and entrepreneurial (in house) provision of a good or service).

D.C. Circuit has long noted, an administrative adjudicator, like a court, is required to balance competing objectives: “On the one hand sufficient breadth must be given to ‘party in interest’ to permit those seriously affected to participate in the administrative and judicial proceedings, without on the other hand placing the proceedings beyond control of the public tribunals.” *Philco Corp. v. FCC*, 257 F.2d 656, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1958). However, neither a court nor an administrative adjudicator should exaggerate the potential problem of participation by a party who supposedly lacks a significant interest. As the D.C. Circuit explained in *United Church of Christ*:

[T]he concept of standing is a practical and functional one designed to insure that only those with a genuine and legitimate interest can participate in a proceeding .... The fears of regulatory agencies that their processes will be inundated by expansion of standing criteria are rarely borne out. Always a restraining factor is the expense of participation in the administrative process, an economic reality which will operate to limit the number of those who will seek participation; legal and related expenses of administrative proceedings are such that even those with large economic interests find the costs burdensome.<sup>13</sup>

*United Church of Christ*, 359 F.2d at 1006.

To overly restrict those entities or individuals who may participate in proceedings before the Judges might compromise the quality of the evidence and testimony received. In that regard, allowing participation by a non-licensee with a substantial and tangible financial interest in the outcome would be consonant with core principles of the standing requirement—ensuring that parties: (1) have a real “stake” in succeeding; (2) have an “incentive” to effectively advocate their positions; and (3) inform the judges of the “practical consequences” of their decision. See Russell W. Jacobs, *In Privity with the Public Domain: The Standing Doctrine, the Public Interest and Intellectual Property*, 30 Santa Clara High Tech. L. J. 415, 427-28 (2014); William A. Fletcher, *The Structure of Standing*, 98 Yale L. J. 221, 222 (1988).

## V. Conclusion

It bears emphasis that Music Reports has not presented facts that would allow the Judges to apply the foregoing general arguments in order to justify Music Reports’s participation in this proceeding.<sup>14</sup> Thus, although this decision does not *per se* foreclose any class or category of


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<sup>13</sup> This point has been borne out in prior proceedings before the Judges and their predecessors, in which initial participants ultimately withdrew their petitions voluntarily or were dismissed after failing to file a Written Direct Statement. See, e.g., *Determination of Royalty Rates for Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings*, 79 FR 23102, 23104 (April 25, 2014) (*Web III*) (voluntary withdrawal by Real Networks, Inc.); *Determination of Reasonable Rates and Terms for the Digital Performance of Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings*, 67 FR 45240, 45241 (July 8, 2002) (*Web I*) (voluntary withdrawal by Music Choice); see also *Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings*, 72 FR 24084, 24094 (May 1, 2007) (*Web II*) (“Forty-two petitions were filed [but] following an order to file a Notice of Intention to submit Written Direct Statements, the participants were reduced to ... twenty-eight ....”)

<sup>14</sup> Not only has Music Reports failed to provide sufficient facts, it appears to have failed to present its factual assertions in a proper form. In that regard, the *Music Reports Response* presents a problem that appears to be chronic with regard to submissions made on behalf of participants in proceedings before the Judges. That *Response* was signed by an attorney who identifies himself as “Vice President, Business & Legal Affairs” for Music Reports.

person or entity from future participation in any type of proceeding, it is clear that Music Reports has failed to show cause why it should be permitted to participate in this proceeding. For these reasons, the Judges hereby **DISMISS** the Petitions to Participate filed by Music Reports.

**SO ORDERED.**

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Suzanne M. Barnett  
Chief Copyright Royalty Judge

DATED: May 30, 2014.

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If a participant seeks to present facts to the Judges, such a presentation cannot competently be made by the attorneys for the participant, unless they have first-hand knowledge of the facts, declare their intention and availability to testify on behalf of the participant, and set forth those facts under oath. (Of course, counsel may continue to sign affidavits, certifications, and declarations regarding procedural or discovery matters as to which they have first-hand knowledge, and they may sign such documents when they serve as vehicles for appending otherwise proper exhibits for submission to the Judges.) In the present case, even if the attorney/officer signed the *Music Reports Response* in his role as legal counsel, this defect would have had no effect on the Judges' decision, because even competent sworn submissions from an individual with first-hand factual knowledge that would have contained the same statements would have been insufficient to change the decision.

## Keys, LaKeshia

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**From:** crb  
**Sent:** Friday, May 30, 2014 10:02 AM  
**Cc:** crb  
**Subject:** 14-CRB-0001-WR (2016-2020) Order  
**Attachments:** 5-30-14 dismissal order (Music Reports show cause).pdf

Attached please find the: 14-CRB-0001-WR (2016-2020) Order Dismissing Petition to Participate (Music Reports)

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*Copyright Royalty Board*



## Keys, LaKeshia

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**From:** Microsoft Exchange  
**To:** Strickler, David; Suzanne Barnett (Chief Judge); Feder, Jesse  
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**Subject:** Delivered: 14-CRB-0001-WR (2016-2020) Order

### Your message has been delivered to the following recipients:

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Suzanne Barnett (Chief Judge)

Feder, Jesse

Subject: 14-CRB-0001-WR (2016-2020) Order

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## Keys, LaKeshia

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**From:** Microsoft Exchange  
**To:** Gina Giuffreda; Ruwe, Stephen; Richard C. Strasser; crb (crb@loc.gov)  
**Sent:** Friday, May 30, 2014 10:02 AM  
**Subject:** Delivered: 14-CRB-0001-WR (2016-2020) Order

### Your message has been delivered to the following recipients:

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crb (crb@loc.gov)

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## Keys, LaKeshia

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**From:** Microsoft Exchange  
**To:** Amazon; Anjan Choudhury; Ari Shohat; Beats Music; Bradley Prendergast; Brendan Collins; Brian Gantman; Bruce Joseph; C.Colin Rushing; Catherine Gellis (cathy@cgcounsel.com); Christopher Harrison; Cynthia Greer; Dale Cendali; David Golden; David Oxenford; David Porter; Denise Leary; Frederick Kass; George Johnson; Glenn Pomerantz; Greenstein, Gary; Harv Hendrickson; IBS Frederick Kass; James Duffett-Smith; Jane Mago; Janet Malloy Link (Janetlink@clearchannel.com); Jared Grusd; Jeff Yasuda; Jennifer Elgin; John Thorne; Joseph Wetzel; Karyn Ablin; Kelly Klaus; Kenneth Steinthal; Kevin Blair (kblair@kloveair1.com); Kurt Hanson; Lee Knife; Lisa Widup; Mark Hansen; Michael Sturm; Nick Krawczyk; Nikki Kuna Mark Hansen asst.; Patrick Donnelly; R. Bruce Rich; Rahn, David; Rhapsody; Russ Hauth; Rusty Hodge; Sabrina Perelman; Thomas Cheney; Todd Larson; William Colitre; William Malone; David Strickler email  
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Nikki Kuna Mark Hansen asst.

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Rhapsody

Russ Hauth

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Thomas Cheney

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William Malone

David Strickler email

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**From:** Kevin Blair <KBlair@kloveair1.com>  
**Sent:** Friday, May 30, 2014 10:03 AM  
**To:** crb  
**Subject:** Automatic reply: 14-CRB-0001-WR (2016-2020) Order

I will be out of the office until June 4 with limited access to email. If an immediate response is needed, please contact Susan O'Coy ([socoy@kloveair1.com](mailto:socoy@kloveair1.com))

## Keys, LaKeshia

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Subject: 14-CRB-0001-WR (2016-2020) Order

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## Keys, LaKeshia

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**From:** Oxenford, David <DOxenford@wbklaw.com>  
**Sent:** Friday, May 30, 2014 10:04 AM  
**To:** crb  
**Subject:** Automatic reply: 14-CRB-0001-WR (2016-2020) Order

I am out of the country and will return to the office on June 2. While away, I should have access to email, but it may be at times outside of normal business hours. For immediate assistance on most matters, please my assistant Rhea Lytle, [rytle@wbklaw.com](mailto:rytle@wbklaw.com), or the paralegal who works with me, Tracey Bogans, [tbogans@wbklaw.com](mailto:tbogans@wbklaw.com). They can either assist you or find someone else who can. For state broadcast association hotline questions, please contact David O'Connor, [doconnor@wbklaw.com](mailto:doconnor@wbklaw.com).

**WILKINSON ) BARKER ) KNAUER ) LLP**

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## Keys, LaKeshia

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**From:** Denise Leary <dleary@npr.org>  
**Sent:** Friday, May 30, 2014 10:13 AM  
**To:** crb  
**Cc:** Denise Leary; Susan Steele; Greg Lewis  
**Subject:** RE: 14-CRB-0001-WR (2016-2020) Order

NPR hereby confirms receipt of the Court's Order Dismissing Petition of Music Reports to Participate. Thank you. Denise Leary

**From:** crb [mailto:crb@loc.gov]  
**Sent:** Friday, May 30, 2014 10:02 AM  
**Cc:** crb  
**Subject:** 14-CRB-0001-WR (2016-2020) Order

Attached please find the: 14-CRB-0001-WR (2016-2020) Order Dismissing Petition to Participate (Music Reports)

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*Copyright Royalty Board*

## Keys, LaKeshia

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**From:** James Duffett-Smith <james@spotify.com>  
**Sent:** Friday, May 30, 2014 10:04 AM  
**To:** crb  
**Subject:** Out of office Re: 14-CRB-0001-WR (2016-2020) Order

Thanks for your message. I'm on leave at the moment, and while I am checking email may be slow to respond.

James

--

James Duffett-Smith  
Head of Licensing Business Affairs  
Spotify USA Inc.  
45 West 18th Street  
New York, NY 10011

+1 (917) 565-3894

Email:james@spotify.com

Find me on Spotify - <http://open.spotify.com/user/jamesds>

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## Keys, LaKeshia

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**Sent:** Friday, May 30, 2014 10:11 AM  
**To:** crb  
**Subject:** RE: 14-CRB-0001-WR (2016-2020) Order

Received, thanks.



Todd Larson  
Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP  
767 Fifth Avenue  
New York, NY 10153  
[todd.larson@weil.com](mailto:todd.larson@weil.com)  
+1 212 310 8238 Direct  
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**Sent:** Friday, May 30, 2014 10:02 AM  
**Cc:** crb  
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## Keys, LaKeshia

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**To:** crb  
**Subject:** RE: 14-CRB-0001-WR (2016-2020) Order

Confirming receipt. Thank you.

**From:** crb [<mailto:crb@loc.gov>]  
**Sent:** Friday, May 30, 2014 7:02 AM  
**Cc:** crb  
**Subject:** 14-CRB-0001-WR (2016-2020) Order

Attached please find the: 14-CRB-0001-WR (2016-2020) Order Dismissing Petition to Participate (Music Reports)

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**Keys, LaKeshia**

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**From:** William Malone <w\_malone@verizon.net>  
**Sent:** Friday, May 30, 2014 10:31 PM  
**To:** crb  
**Subject:** 14-CRB-0001-WR (2016-2020) Order

I acknowledge receipt as counsel for IBS and WHRB (FM).

**Bill Malone**

On 05/30/14, crb<[crb@loc.gov](mailto:crb@loc.gov)> wrote:

Attached please find the: 14-CRB-0001-WR (2016-2020) Order Dismissing Petition to Participate (Music Reports)

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